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Abstract: This article investigates intergenerational income mobility among top-income people in 
Denmark focusing on the impact of assortative mating. Earnings and capital income are the 
variables of interest included in the analyzes testing the hypothesis that both wealth and social 
heritage are transferred from rich parents to their children. Using administrative registers allow us 
to look at small fractions of the populations, i.e. dynasties, and to distinguish between sons and 
daughters and to observe their eventual spouses’ incomes. We find that intergenerational mobility is 
lower in the top, in particular, when including capital income in the total income. Also we find the 
marriage match has a stronger impact on the family-to-family income transfer in the top of the 
income distribution where the daughter marries a man more like her father than herself. The highest 
persistence, however, is between first- and second-generation households, especially between father 
and mother’s aggregated incomes and that of their son and daughter-in-law’s with a correlation 
close to a half.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Intergenerational income mobility is of great importance for the understanding of how individual 
opportunities and social status outcomes vary across the income distribution. The question is to 
what extent the offspring of low-income, middle-income, and high-income parents tend to 
reproduce their parents’ economic position. In most studies within this field the focus is on the 
transmission of income from father to son or from father to daughter, although there are also some 
studies on the mother-to-son or mother-to-daughter transmission of income. Here, we investigate all 
possible transmissions, primarily in the top end of the income distribution, and in a way that differs 
from that of most other studies. We examine 1) the father-son and father-daughter income mobility, 
2) the correlation between father and son-in-law, and father and daughter-in-law, and 3) the 
correlation between the household incomes of two generations. Mothers’ incomes are also used as 
first-generation income, but those results are primarily presented in the Appendix. The implication 
is that assortative mating comes in naturally as an explanation of how randomly distributed or 
inherited income appears between generations belonging to top income individuals and households, 
raising the question: Do we have a nouveau-rich or a dynasty society where “money marries 
money” (Mann, 1901)? 
 We use data from administrative registers at Statistics Denmark, enabling us to study the 
mobility at the very top end of the income distribution because we view information on all Danish 
citizens. Our interpretation of ‘intergenerational income mobility’ follows the usual definition: the 
position of one generation in a rank order relative to the position of a second generation in its rank 
order. Thus, if a randomly sampled individual achieves a position in the income distribution 
independently of the position his or her father or mother achieved, the intergenerational income 
mobility is perfect or complete.  The intergenerational income mobility expresses the correlation 
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between parent and child positions in the income distribution in inverse terms: increased correlation 
implies decreased mobility and no correlation perfect mobility.  
 The following section gives the background and a review of the literature, which leads to the 
third section where the theory and empirical framework are discussed. The data and the 
methodology are described in the fourth section followed by section five presenting the results from 
analysing the questions raised. Section six concludes the study. 
 
2. Background 
 
Within the recent decade, there has been increasing focus on top income shares over time (Piketty, 
2001;  Atkinson, 2005; Piketty & Saez, 2003; Leigh, 2005; Piketty, 2007; Atkinson, Piketty & Saez, 
2010; 2011), including studies of top incomes in the Nordic countries (cf. Gustafsson & Jansson, 
2008; Hirvonen, 2008; Roine & Waldenström, 2010; Jäntti, Riihelä, Sullström & Tuomala, 2010; 
Aaberge & Atkinson 2010). The growth of this branch of research has been paralleled by one of 
reproduction of inequalities, that is, of intergenerational income mobility (e.g. Becker & Tomes, 
1979; 1986; Solon, 1992; 1999; Zimmerman, 1992; Corak & Heisz, 1999; Chadwick & Solon, 
2002; Mazumder, 2005a; 2005b; Mayer & Lopoo, 2005; Björklund & Jäntti, 1997;; 2009; 
Burkhauser & Couch, 2005; Kearney, 2006; Blanden, Gregg & Macmillan, 2007; Pascual, 2009; 
Black & Devereux 2010).1 Whereas the top-income literature focuses largely on distributions of 
resources at the societal and aggregate levels, the intergenerational income mobility literature 
focuses more on individuals and families. Very recently, however, these two traditions have been 
combined in studies of intergenerational top income mobility, see e.g. Björklund, Roine & 
                                                            
1 Cf. below examples of cohort studies of intergenerational income mobility over time and other more specific studies. 
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Waldenström (2010), Nam (2004) and for a study of the intergenerational poverty income mobility 
see Corak (2006)2. 
 Intergenerational income mobility in the top is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, studies 
of intergenerational income mobility somewhat consistently reveal changing associations across 
income levels with intergenerational income elasticities in the top and in the bottom differing 
substantially from those of the middle range (Nam, 2004; Mazumder, 2005a; Harding, Jencks, 
Mayer & Lopoo, 2005; Jäntti et al., 2006; Björklund, Roine & Waldenström, 2010).3 Thus, simply 
considering overall elasticities of the entire population may be misleading. Secondly, the top 
income literature reveals that top income shares in the Western world are increasing, creating a 
particular need for explanations of this phenomenon in which mechanisms of (low) 
intergenerational top income mobility potentially play a role. This is also why this third branch of 
research has not only called for increased focus on intergenerational top income mobility as a 
complement to the more widely studied top income inequalities for purely intellectual purposes; 
social justice plays a role too. For instance, people tend to judge so-called “self-made individual” 
positively, but “inheritors” negatively (Björklund, Roine & Waldenström, 2010; see also Black & 
Devereux, 2010; Nam, 2004; Roemer, 2009). 
  
Mechanisms of income inequality 
Western economies have seemingly diverged regarding the development in top income shares since 
WWII. In English speaking countries, shares show a U-shaped development over time beginning 
with a decline and ending with an increase, whereas continental European countries show a 
                                                            
2 In addition, some studies have included intergenerational top income mobility as a part of broader inquiries into 
intergenerational income mobility in general, e.g. Hirvonen (2008) and Bratberg et al. (2007b).  
3 Bratberg et al. (2007b) suggest that in the case of the Nordic countries elasticities are linear, whereas in the US and the 
UK they are convex across the income distribution.  
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stabilized share over time (for a review, see Atkinson & Piketty, 2007). More recent research has 
shown that the Nordic countries belong to the former group rather than the latter (for a review, see 
Atkinson, Piketty & Saez, 2010, 2011). Structural factors and public policy undoubtedly are 
decisive in this regard. Piketty (2001: 548ff) identifies several factors in contemporary society that 
may cause an even further increase in inequality in the future, for instance, the rise of the 
information and service economy (new sectors tend to favor rapid accumulation), and the increased 
political focus that recent decades have witnessed on lowering of marginal income and corporate 
tax rates, which have been identified as factors explaining the rising share of incomes in the very 
top (e.g. Atkinson 2004; for cases of the Nordic countries see Gustafsson & Jansson, 2008; Roine & 
Waldenström, 2010; Jäntti, Riihelä, Sullström & Tuomala, 2010; Aaberge & Atkinson, 2010).4 
Piketty also mentions intergenerational persistence and patrimony as important mechanisms in this 
regard. Complementing this, Hussain, Munk & Bonke (2009) point to several other structural 
features related to high degrees of intergenerational earnings mobility, for example, condensed 
income distributions, active labor market policies, free access to the educational system, and an 
equal opportunity-oriented educational policy all contribute to higher intergenerational income 
mobility (2009: 80). In addition, changes in compositions of educational (e.g. Davies, Zhang & 
Zeng, 2005), family (e.g. Björklund, Jäntti & Solon, 2007), and political institutions (e.g. Ichino, 
Karabarbounis & Moretti, 2011) are likely to induce changes in the income elasticity between 
parents and children. Lastly, Mayer & Lopoo (2008) show that high-spending welfare states are 
likely to increase intergenerational mobility.  
 These mechanisms of inequality are of great interest because there seems to be a 
negative association between cross-sectional inequality and intergenerational mobility (Andrews & 
Leigh, 2009). Thus, if income inequality has increased in many countries over the last decades, we 
                                                            
4In particular, some of these studies note the restraints on progressive income taxation implemented in many countries 
in the early 1990s. 
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can expect intergenerational income mobility to have decreased, particularly in the top end of the 
income distribution (see Solon, 2004). 
 
Intergenerational top income mobility 
Although, theoretical (Solon, 2004) and empirical (Andrews & Leigh, 2009), analyzes suggest that 
increased income inequality is associated with decreased intergenerational income mobility, 
research is ambiguous as to whether the intergenerational income mobility has actually decreased 
historically in tandem with increasing income inequality. Whereas changes in the distribution of 
incomes are straightforward to measure, changes in intergenerational mobility are more complex. 
This may explain why research results differ substantially (see Corcoran, 2001; Levine & 
Mazumder, 2002; Fertig, 2003; Nam, 2004; Blanden et al. 2004; Mayer & Lopoo, 2005; Harding et 
al., 2005; Bratberg et al., 2005; 2007a; Hertz, 2007; Pekkala & Lucas, 2007; Blanden, Gregg & 
Macmillan 2007; Aaronson & Mazumder, 2008; Lee & Solon, 2009; for a study of earnings see 
Nicoletti & Ermisch, 2007). Some of these studies show increased elasticities between cohorts, 
others show no change, whereas only a few studies show decreased elasticities.5 Thus, overall, 
intergenerational mobility seems to have decreased. For instance, Nam’s (2004) study of American 
sons at the age of 11–15 years in 1969 and 1979, respectively, shows that transmission of high 
income increased significantly, whereas transmission of low income remained stable. However, at 
this point, the empirical debate is mainly a methodological one. Lee & Solon (2009) show that the 
conclusions of Nam and other studies rest on misleading comparison of cohorts by relying on only 
two single income years. Lee & Solon use the same survey data (PSID) on all available years to 
show that no significant decrease in intergenerational income mobility has occurred within recent 
decades.  
                                                            
5Details also vary as to when the increase happened, in which parts of the income distribution, and between which 
families, and for what reasons. 
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  Furthermore, the critique of economists (i.e. with an income approach) regarding the 
hypothesis that intergenerational income mobility has decreased has been paralleled by a 
sociological one (i.e. with a class approach) arguing that mobility between fathers’ occupation and 
children’s occupation has not changed substantially (Goldthorpe &  Jackson, 2007).6 However, 
doubt has been cast on this result since it is based on a comparison of the fathers’ class and the 
child’s class alone. Beller (2009) shows that taking mothers into account reveals a substantial 
increase in intergenerational association (lower mobility) between different cohorts. 
 In conclusion, as Lee & Solon (2009: 771) also note, even though we may suspect the 
impact of substaintially increased income inequality since WWII on intergenerational mobility to be 
negative, research in changes in intergenerational mobility is ambiguous about recent 
developments.  
 To further complicate the matter, even in countries with low income inequality and 
high intergenerational income mobility, intergenerational mobility in the top may still be very low. 
For instance, Björklund, Roine & Waldenström (2010) show that in Sweden (a country that pursues 
many of the policies described above with an internationally high overall intergenerational income 
mobility) intergenerational top (0.1 percentile) income mobility is very low. Using piecewise linear 
regression and quantile regression on approximately 100,000 pairs of Swedish fathers and sons 
comparing averages of sons’ level of income in their 40s to averages of fathers’ income while sons 
were living at home (in line with Corak, 2006; and Björklund & Jäntti, 2009), they show that 
intergenerational income mobility decreases within the top incomes and reaches a very low level for 
the very top (with an elasticity above 0.9, compared with an overall elasticity of 0.26), and much 
more so for “total income” than for “earnings”.  
                                                            
6For a response to this critique, see Blanden, Gregg & MacMillan (2010). For further details and discussion, see Erikson 
& Goldthorpe (2002; 2009; 2010), Goldthorpe & Mills (2008), and McIntosh & Munk (2009a,b). Note that these 
studies of Britain – sociologic and economic alike – are based on survey data, which implies larger uncertainty of 
estimates than when based on register data as used in this study. 
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 Similarly, based on a comprehensive study of about 400,000 pairs of Canadian fathers and 
sons, Corak & Heisz (1999) conclude a very high elasticity within the top percentile of income 
(from a mean of 0.2 to 0.8). The inverse is present in the other extreme of the income scale where 
elasticity comes close to 0. These results suggest that mechanisms of intergenerational mobility in 
the top are not necessarily the same as those in the lower end or in the population at large.  
 Before Chadwick & Solon’s (2002) study, research almost unanimously excluded daughters 
(and mothers) from inquiries of intergenerational income mobility, focusing solely on fathers and 
sons. To some extent, this was justified by the fact that western societies are economically stratified 
by sex, which has traditionally made mothers’ incomes unreliable measures of their status (see also 
Ermisch, Francesconi & Siedler, 2006). Based on PSID data, Chadwick and Solon conclude that a 
substantial level of father-daughter intergenerational elasticity exists (though somewhat lower than 
for sons). After Chadwick & Solon’s study other studies appeared (Mazumder 2005; Bratberg et al. 
2005; 2007; Raaum et al. 2007; Holmlund 2008; Hirvonen 2008; Nilsen et al. 2008). According to 
Jäntti et al. (2006) and Black & Devereux (2010: 15ff), this literature reveals similar national 
differences in elasticity between fathers and sons (about 0.5–0.67 for the US, 0.3 for the UK and 
somewhat less for the Nordic countries)8 and a general tendency for the father-daughter elasticity to 
be lower. For the mother-daughter income elasticity, three studies are of particular interest. First, 
Österberg (2000) shows that, even though mother’s earnings influence child’s earnings less than 
father’s does, this difference is lower for daughters than for sons. Second, Hirvonen (2008) 
compares the result of Chadwick & Solon with the case of Sweden and finds somewhat lower 
elasticities in the US. Hirvonen also looks at different intervals of the income distribution and finds 
                                                            
7 This result is somewhat higher than that gauged by previous standard references (see in particular Solon (1992) and 
Zimmerman (1992)). This is due to persistent transitory fluctuations in income biasing previous results down 
(Mazumder, 2005b). 
 
8 However, comparison may be problematic due to linearly different patterns of intergenerational earnings mobility in 
Anglo-Saxon countries and convex trends in the Nordic countries (Bratberg et al., 2007b; for further discussion of 
cross-country comparisons, see Muller, 2010). 
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that mobility is higher in the upper than in the lower end, but that mobility in the top is still less 
(even for daughters) than in the middle range. Finally, comparing the US, the UK and three Nordic 
countries, Raaum et al. (2007) confirm the higher mobility in the Nordic countries when it comes to 
single men, single women and married men, but only for married women if measured by family 
income. If measured as personal earnings, no difference is evident between countries for married 
women9. 
These results all stress the importance of a gender-specific perspective when inquiring into 
mechanisms of intergenerational top income mobility. And the gender perspective also raises the 
question of the impact of spouses (i.e. of assortative mating) on different generations’ access to 
economic resources 
 
Assortative mating among top incomes 
Assortative mating, meaning that individuals marry spouses who are like themselves over a number 
of dimensions, is well-documented (for an early example, see Glenn, Ross, & Tully, 1974). A 
review of such literature by Mare (1991) shows that spouses tend to be similar in terms of 
educational attainment, occupation, and ethnic background. Recently, Chiappori et al. (2010) shows 
that not only socioeconomic characteristics but also anthropometric characteristics/physical 
attractiveness matter for the matching on the marriage market. In the German and British contexts, 
Ermish, Franscesconi and Siedler (2006) estimate that as much as 40–50 % of the correlation 
between parents’ and child’s permanent family income can be attributed to the spouse, due to a high 
correlation between the spouses’ human capital (for related studies, see Lam & Schoeni, 1994; 
Chadwick & Solon, 2002). As Ermish et al. put it: “both parents and parents-in-law shape their 
                                                            
9Beller (2009) finds that when looking at class belongings the inclusion of both mother’s and father’s origins yields a 
stronger predictor of observed mobility patterns than when only the father is included. 
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offspring’s status.” (2006: 659). Of course, the more assortative mating that takes place, the truer 
this becomes (see Lam & Schoeni, 1994). 
The importance of different characteristics may be even more pronounced at the top 
end of the income distribution because a son or a daughter wants to continue the family position by 
having “high quality” children (Foster, 2002; Lefgren & McIntyre, 2006). Chadwick and Solon’s 
(2002) study likewise indicates the importance of the role played by assortative mating in 
reproducing income positions across generations since income elasticities are found to be as high 
for children’s spouses as for the children themselves. Thus, by not limiting the investigation to the 
relation between parent and child, but by extending it to the relation between mother/father couple 
and child/spouse couple, even higher elasticities are likely to be found. Assortative mating by 
income seems to be an important factor in explaining intergenerational persistence and reproduction 
of inequality (see also Mare, 2000). 
 
3. Theory and empirical framework 
According to Nam (2004: 189), there are two main branches of theory regarding mechanisms of 
intergenerational income mobility: human capital theory focus on parents’ transmission and 
investment in human capital (education and skills) in their children (Becker & Tomes 1979; 1986, 
Goldberger 1989, Mulligan 1999, Solon 2004), and the non-economic family resource model focus 
on the ability of parents to provide stimulating environments for their children rather than merely 
investing economic resources in them. However, as in most other studies, in the following analyzes, 
we do not distinguish between these mechanisms. 
 Intergenerational income mobility is a measure of the degree of income transmission from one 
generation to the next generation. Hence, a high income mobility pictures that children’s incomes 
are independent of parents’ incomes. However, if social heritage is present, the second generation’s 
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incomes are correlated with the first generation’s incomes so that the income of a child can 
somehow be predicted by his/her parents’ incomes. This holds for earnings provided both 
generations are occupied on the labor market, while capital income can be transferred between 
generations even in cases where there are no earnings in one or both of the generations. 
The intergenerational determination of children’s incomes can be expressed by the following 
regression equation: 
 
(1) log yci = αc + βc log ypi + εcij , 
 
where log yci denotes the natural logarithm of income of a child in family i and ypi the corresponding 
measure of the parent. The error term εcij depicts the combined effect on the child’s income of 
factors orthogonal to parental income, and βc is the intergenerational elasticity of the child’s 
permanent income given the parents’ long-term income.  
 If assortative mating in the second generation is present, we will find a high correlation 
between the child’s and his/her partner’s income, see Hirvonen (2008). This can be expressed as  
 
(2) γ = corr (log yci , log ypai ) , 
 
where pa indicates the partner. A high level of assortative mating will diminish intergenerational 
mobility on a family-to-family level and accentuate mobility if the matching on the marriage market 
is random and not conditional on income. The family-to-family income mobility can be depicted as 
 
(3) log ycpai = αcpa + βcpa log yfmi + εcpai , 
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where ycpa (child and his/her partner) is the second generation’s family income, yfmi is first 
generation family income, and fm indicates father and mother. 
 Intergenerational income persistence on a family level, βcpa, will therefore be determined by 
two different channels: the parent to child channel, βc, and the assortative mating determinant 
calculated as either the elasticity of parents and children-in-laws’ relationships or simply as the 
differential between βcpa and βc. Obviously, this requires that the second- and first-generation 
becomes married/co-habits, while the usual intergenerational mobility analyzes of parents to 
children also include single families in each generation. 
 As most children grow up with siblings, the observed variance in earnings is due to factors 
common to the families, such as parental involvement in child’s schooling and neighborhood 
quality, and thus not only family income. Hence, Levine & Mazumder (2007) show that half the 
variance among siblings’ earnings and wages can be explained by family and community 
influences. To take account of this phenomenon the error term εcij in (1) is decomposed as follows: 
 
(4) εcij = γci + ηcij + νij , 
 
where γci is a component common to all siblings in the family, and ηcij likewise a component 
specific to every individual, and, lastly, νij the error term. 
  Based on this theoretical framework the research hypotheses addressed in the 
following are that in the top of the income distribution:  
1) income mobility is relatively low, particularly for sons  
2) assortative mating is relatively high 
3) income persistence among rich families is high. 
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4. Data 
The data used stem from administrative registers at Statistics Denmark including information on 
earnings, income, taxes, benefit payments, education, labor market attachment, and other 
socioeconomic demographics for the period 1980–2008. As every Danish resident or citizen has a 
unique personal ID number, the information in the registers can be linked to the individuals 
concerned, their spouses, and to their parents. This is what makes it possible to analyze 
intergenerational mobility issues. 
 Using register information also solves the problems of coverage and attrition because the 
information covers the whole population. 
 As the data window covers “only” the last 25–30 years and the best proxy of a 
permanent income is the income earned when being in the 30s, the second generation in this study 
is aged 35–42 years in 2008 or, equivalently, 7–14 years in 1980. This is considered to be a 
relatively broad age-bracket, which is important to minimize the problem of non-homogeneity in 
the residuals, see e.g. Lee & Solon (2009), who stress that the usual assumption of unbiased 
measurement error does not hold for intergenerational income mobility because ‘individuals with 
high lifetime income tend to have steeper income growth trajectories’ (p. 768). Therefore these 
authors prefer longer observation timespans (from ages 25 to 48 years in their study) controlled for 
interaction between child’s age and parental income. Further, it is important to note that even five-
year periods may considerably underestimate the intergenerational persistence. Hendricks (2007) 
shows that measures of persistence based on lifetime earnings increase 30% compared with 
measures using 5-year periods.  
In our study, the second generation children are aged 7–18 years when their fathers’ incomes are 
included in 1980–84.  
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According to Chadwick & Solon (2002), early studies in intergenerational income mobility 
often underestimated elasticities because they used only short-term measures of parents’ incomes. 
And even though single year measures at the age of 30–40 years do not imply such a bias (for 
specifications, see Böhlmark & Lindquist 2006), the problem of short-term income fluctuations 
remains. Accordingly, in line with Björklund, Roine & Waldenström (2010), we average income 
over multiple-year spans.  
We use the standard father-son (and father-daughter) correlations as well as the correlations 
between father’s income and son-in-law’s income and daughter-in-law’s income. Similarly, we 
include the mother as the first generation parent. Besides individual incomes we also use household 
incomes (mother and father’s pooled income, and the child’s and his or her spouse’s pooled 
income) to be able to investigate to what extent second-generation partners contribute to keeping 
the income position and economic status of the first generation households intact. So the 
intergenerational transmission/correlation is from 1) father to son, 2) father to daughter, 3) father to 
son-in-law, 4) father to daughter-in-law, 5) father and mother to son and daughter-in-law, and 6) 
father and mother to daughter and son-in-law. The transmission channels 1 and 2 refer to the usual 
nature and nurture determinants, while 3 and 4 are mating-related and 5 and 6 are a mixture of these 
different determinants. 
The same income concepts as in Björklund et al. (2010) are applied, e.g. individual earnings 
from work and/or business and individual total income (earnings and capital income), and only 
persons with positive incomes in all ten years (five for child and five for parent) are included. We 
use five years’ average incomes for parent (1980-84) and child (2004-08), whereas Björklund uses 
six years’ for fathers and ten years’ for sons. All incomes are inflated to 2008 using the CPI from 
Statistics Denmark. The final income concept is the average of natural log of each year’s income.  
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 The income sample includes 264,307 and the earnings sample 202,720 pairs of father and 
sons, and 259,913 and 188,968 pairs of father and daughters, while the same numbers of pairs of 
fathers to married children are 166,429; 137,998; 174,629 and 134,616, respectively. The mother-
child sample sizes are roughly similar. The number of son-in-laws and daughter-in-laws with 
(positive) income and earnings information is more modest, namely 70,966; 59,822; 114,500 and 
88,068. This implies that we have between around 600 and 2,600 in the top income percentile and, 
thereby, around 60–260 in the 0.1 top income percentile – the latter numbers are often too small to 
find significant OLS elasticities (contrary to quantile regression elasticities). 
 
   <Table 1> 
 
   <Table 2> 
 
 Tables 1 and 2 give an overview of the statistical information in the Danish data used here. 
We find that the age-differentials are considerably bigger for fathers than for fathers’ offspring, 
which is in line with Björklund et al. (2010), and not that surprising since there is a age limit on 
sons/daughters, but not for fathers. Hence, the variation in sons’ and daughters ages’ is between 35 
and 42 years, while the fathers’ ages vary between 37 and 87 years with the oldest found in the 
upper end of the distribution (Table 1). As expected, we also find that the discrepancy between 
income and earnings increases with earnings level or income level and in particular for the second 
generation. At the top end of the distributions, sons’ incomes are 13% higher than sons’ earnings 
and that of daughters is 10% higher, whereas father’s income is only 7% over the earnings. For the 
median pairs the differentials are 4%, 4% and 0%, reflecting that the disparity of capital income has 
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increased between the two generations, see Björklund et al. (2010) for qualitatively the same 
findings for Sweden. 
 We compared married sons’ earnings and income with those of married daughters and found a 
difference for the median persons of about one third in both cases in favor of the sons (Table 2). For 
children in the 0.1 top percentile the difference between the two sexes is two to one for earnings and 
even bigger for income (120%). Table 2 also shows that this picture is nearly the same when 
comparing earnings and income of sons-in-law with those of daughters-in-law, and that sons and 
sons-in-law as well as daughters and daughters-in-law earn and have incomes very much like each 
other.   
 
Methodology 
The calculation of intergenerational earnings mobility applies the elasticity coefficient method in 
Equations 1 and 3 in Section 3. We include generation pairs only where both generations have 
positive incomes in all years under consideration10. 
Analyzing income mobility in the top of the distribution implies that we believe in the possible 
existence of non-linearity so that social heritage is not equally strong across the whole distribution 
(Bratberg et al. 2007b, Grawe 2004). 
For that reason we run quantile regressions as well as piecewise OLS regressions, where the 
first ones estimate the effect of an explanatory variable at specific points in the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable, i.e. assesses whether an increase in the parent’s income raises 
income differently for the child at different places in their income distribution. In contrast, the 
                                                            
10 We address negative, zero and missing incomes—or, in short, non-positive incomes—as follows (available upon 
request). 1) Comparing simple descriptive measures on the included (those with positive incomes) and excluded (those 
with non-positive incomes) persons. 2) Doing some of the main mobility analyses by including the non-positive 
incomes by assuming that they are extremely low, e.g. 1,000 DKK, in which case the natural log is zero since incomes 
are expressed in 1,000s. 
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piecewise OLS regressions imply that we run equations separately for parent-child pairs belonging 
to different parent income fractiles investigated. 
 
5. Results 
In the following we show the results from the quantile regressions across child income fractiles 
examining how sensitive children’s incomes and earnings are to their parents’ incomes and 
earnings, i.e. using piecewise OLS regressions reveal nearly the same non-linear patterns in many 
instances but for example not always in top (the OLS regressions are presented in the Appendix). 
The same is the case for the estimations of parent to children-in-law mobility, here, too, we refer to 
results obtained from the quantile regression estimations, but also discuss OLS. 
 
5.1 Intergenerational top  income mobility – parents to children 
 
 <Table 3> 
 
Table 3 shows that the intergenerational elasticity is 0.146 for earnings and 0.218 for income 
estimated at the median for father-son pairs, while it is somewhat smaller for father-daughter pairs, 
namely 0.098 and 0.162 (we obtain similar pattern when applying OLS regressions). For both pairs 
we find an increase in generational income persistence over the level of sons’ and daughters’ 
earnings and incomes. At the 90th quantile the coefficients for the father-son relationships are 0.217 
and 0.292, respectively, and 0.132 and 0.195 for father-daughters, and at the 99th quantile we find 
even bigger coefficients, namely 0.257, 0.333, 0.178 and 0.225, which implies that a 10% income 
differential among fathers is related to a 3.3%  income increase for sons’ at this end of their income 
distribution. At the very top end of the distribution—the 99.5th fractile—the father-son income 
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persistence is 0.348 and for father-daughter 0.233, whereas the earnings persistence is lower for 
both father-sons and father-daughters (Figure 1). In the piecewise OLS regressions we do not find 
the same general increase in intergenerational income persistence over father’s income levels. 
 
 <Figure 1> 
 
For Sweden the same non-linearities in the father-son relationships over the income distribution 
are found and at virtually the same levels as for Denmark (Björklund et al., 2010). Hence, the 
income coefficients at the 99th fractile are 0.380 for Sweden (ibid, Table 3) and 0.333 for Denmark, 
indicating that dynasties prevail slightly more in Sweden than in Denmark.  
It is noteworthy that the non-linearity in the relationship in father-son income and earnings 
distributions is quite similar for Denmark, i.e. the persistence increases to the same extent over the 
fractiles in the two distributions, while this does not apply to the same extent for Sweden. Here 
Björklund et al. (2010) find that the income mobility increases over the distribution, whereas the 
earnings distribution increases only slightly. A possible explanation for this difference is that the 
degree of equality of opportunities for wage earners is bigger in Sweden than in Denmark at the 
same time as the distribution of capital incomes is more skewed and more often transmitted 
between generations in Swedish than in Danish society. 
 
 <Table 4> 
 
For the mother-child relationships we find smaller income elasticities than for the father-child 
relationships that hold over the whole income distribution (Table 4). Hence, the income mobility 
coefficients for mother-son are 0.045 at the median position of the distribution—50th fractile—and 
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0.097 at the top end of the second generation’s income distribution—99.5th fractile—compared with 
0.218 and 0.348 for the same father-son relationships. The mother-daughter relationships were also 
smaller all over the distribution than those of the father-daughter—0.063 versus 0.162 in the middle 
of the distribution and 0.082 versus 0.233 at the 99.5th fractile. The same pattern is found for 
earnings mobility. Also we find  this pattern of higher father-child elasticities than mother-child 
elasticities using piecewise OLS regressions, but mainly for lower up to the third quartile parental  
income. An obvious explanation for the lower income persistence between mother and child than 
between father and child is that more mothers than fathers were educated, that mothers are more 
often out of the labor market, and that, nowadays, males and females are on more equal terms 
educationally and regarding the labor market. 
That gender differentials still prevail is shown by the fact that at median income—50th 
fractile—the mother-daughter coefficient is greater than the mother-son coefficient—0.063 and 
0.045—while for the father-daughter and father-son coefficients, the opposite holds—0.162 and 
0.218. However, at the higher levels of the distribution—99th and 99.5th fractiles—both the mother-
son and the father-son coefficients are greater than those for daughters, indicating that daughters 
from well-off backgrounds are relatively less influenced by their mother’s income position than are 
other daughters from lower positions in the income distribution. 
We also found that mother-child earnings and income mobilities are relatively close to each 
other, while income persistence is greater than earnings persistence for father-child relationships. 
This indicates that children, and in particular sons, “gain” more capital income from their father 
than from their mother. The income coefficient is far greater than the earnings coefficient for father-
son relationships than for father-daughter relationships. 
 
5.2 Assortative mating—parents to children-in-law elasticities 
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An important aspect of income and earnings mobility is the role of the marriage market, enabling 
some people to improve or keep the position in society at a family level and consequently maintain  
or increase their individual consumption possibilities through marriage. Others may rely mostly on 
their own income, having made other choices on the marriage market. However, the existence of 
assortative mating decreases the chances of moving around in the distributions. If this is the case at 
the top of the income distribution, the same rich families will continue to represent a top earnings 
and income class in society, i.e. the existence of dynasties. 
In the following, we  start by investigating the extent of assortative mating by looking at the 
correlation between son’s and their wife’s (son-daughter-in-law), and daughter’s and their 
husband’s (daughter-son-in-law) incomes. We found a high correlation in the income between the 
couples—see equation 2. We then investigate the role of assortative mating by looking at the 
intergenerational income mobility for father-daughter-in-law and father-son-in-law pairs and the 
same for mother-child-in-law relationships. Lastly, we analyze the father-son’s family income and 
father-daughter’s family income to see if this gives the same picture of the earnings and income 
mobility between generations and over the income distribution as do the father-to-child-in-law 
comparisons.  
 
 <Table 5> 
 
For the median income fractile the correlation between sons’ and their wives’ incomes is 
0.199 and 0.258 between daughters’ and their husbands’ incomes, while the same correlations are 
0.113 and 0.157 for earnings (Table 5), which shows that it is easier for daughters than for sons to 
find economically equal partners. By moving upwards in the earnings and income distributions we 
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find that the correlations increase for son-daughter-in-law relationships while it decreases for 
daughter-son-in-law relationships, and at the top end of the distribution—95th fractile—the son-
daughter-in-law relationships are bigger than those of daughter-son-in-law relationships. This 
indicates that assortative mating is more pronounced for sons than for daughters independently of 
using earnings or income as the economic measure. 
That earnings and income mobility is smaller between fathers and daughters than between 
fathers and sons across the income distribution is already shown above. Table 3 shows that this also 
holds, and even to the same degree, when looking only at fathers and their married children. For 
children-in-law we find the same pattern, namely that the relationship between fathers’ and their 
daughters-in-laws’ incomes is smaller than the relationship between fathers’ and their sons-in-laws’ 
incomes. The father and children-in-law correlations, however, are generally smaller than that of 
fathers and their offspring so that the offspring is economically more alike their parents than 
children-in-law and therefore more “reliable” in ensuring some persistence in keeping the social 
position intact. This pattern emerges in most parts of the income distribution (Figure 2), which 
indicates that a son-in-law is not as capable as a biological son of securing a high degree of income 
persistence from the one to the next generation, and the same holds for daughters-in-law relatively 
to biological daughters—for both we find the same correlations to their father-in-law/father’s 
income throughout the income distributions. 
 
 <Table 6> 
 
Lastly, we find that income mobility at a family level is smaller for father and mother pooled 
to son and daughter-in-law pooled than for father and mother pooled to daughter and son-in-law 
pooled (Table 6). This holds for the whole income distribution as well as for the earnings 
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distribution. At the top end of the income distribution—99.5th fractile—the coefficients for parents 
and their daughter and son-in-law is 0.398 and for parents and their son and daughter-in-law as high 
as 0.480. These coefficients are the highest of all coefficients found, indicating that at a family level 
there is a very high degree of economic persistence between generations among rich people in 
Denmark. 
 
6. Summary 
 
Most studies on intergenerational earnings and income mobility focus on the father-child 
transmission of opportunities and social status. They examine the extent to which the offspring of 
low-income, middle-income, and high-income parents tend to reproduce their parents’ economic 
position. In this study, we also look at the mother-to-son and mother-to-daughter transmission of 
income. The implication is that assortative mating presents itself as a natural explanation of how 
randomly distributed or inherited income appears between generations belonging to top income 
individuals and households, raising the question: Do we have a nouveau-rich or a dynasty society 
where “money marries money”? 
By applying data from administrative registers at Statistics Denmark, we were able to study the 
mobility all over the income distribution, including the top end, since we had income information 
on all Danish citizens. We used quantile regressions as well as piecewise OLS regressions. 
In line with most other studies, we found that the intergenerational elasticity is higher for income 
than for earnings and that these elasticities are smaller for father-daughter pairs. For both pairs we 
found an increase in generational income persistence with increasing levels of sons’ and daughters’ 
earnings and incomes. At the very top end of the distribution—the 99.5th fractile—the father-son 
income persistence is 0.348 and 0.233 for father-daughter. For Sweden the same non-linearities in 
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the father-son relationships over the income distribution are found but at a somewhat higher level 
than for Denmark. 
We also found that mother-child earnings and income mobilities are comparatively equal in size, 
whereas income persistence is greater than earnings persistence for father-child relationships. This 
indicates that father’s capital income is more important than mother’s capital income in increasing 
income persistence, which may reflect that it used to be males who inherited most of the capital 
income. 
An important aspect of income and earnings mobility is the role of the marriage market, enabling 
some people to improve the position in society at a family level and, thereby, to increase their 
individual consumption possibilities through marriage, while other people may rely mostly on their 
own income, having made other choices on the marriage market. However, the existence of 
assortative mating decreases the chances of moving around in the distributions. If this is the case at 
the top of the income distribution, the same rich families will continue to represent a top earnings 
and income class in society. 
For the median income fractile the correlation between sons’ and their wives’ incomes is 
lower than between daughters’ and their husbands’ incomes, which suggests that it is easier for 
daughters than for sons to find economically equal partners. Moving upwards in the earnings and 
income distributions we found that the correlations increase for son-daughter-in-law relationships, 
while they decrease for daughter-son-in-law relationships, and at the top end of the distribution—
95th fractile—the son-daughter-in-law relationships were bigger than those of daughter-son-in-law 
relationships. 
We also found that the father and children-in-law correlations are generally smaller than that 
of fathers and their offspring so that the offspring is economically more alike their parents than the 
children-in-law and therefore more “reliable” in ensuring some persistence in keeping the social 
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position intact. This pattern emerges in most parts of the income distribution, which indicates that a 
son-in-law is not as capable as a biological son of securing a high degree of income persistence 
from one to the next generation, and the same holds for daughters-in-law relatively to biological 
daughters—for both we found the same correlations to their father-in-law/father’s income 
throughout the income distributions. 
Finally, we find that income mobility at a family level is smaller for father and mother pooled 
to son and daughter-in-law pooled than for father and mother pooled to daughter and son-in-law 
pooled. 
This holds for the whole income distribution as well as for the earnings distribution. At the top 
end of the income distribution—99.5th fractile—the coefficients for parents and their daughter and 
son-in-law are 0.398 and as high as 0.480 for parents and their son and daughter-in-law. These 
coefficients are the highest of all coefficients found, indicating that at a family level there is a very 
high degree of economic persistence between generations among the rich in Denmark. 
Our results are important because they shed light on the reproduction of richness (and 
power) in a society known for its relatively equal cross-sectional distribution of economic 
resources. Even here, assortative mating at the top end of the income distribution is more 
pronounced than in the distribution in general, indicating the desire of sons or daughters to maintain 
the family position by reproducing income positions across generations. Thus, when looking 
beyond the relation between individual parent and individual child to the relation between parent 
household and child household—first and second generations—even more intergenerational income 
persistence is likely to be seen. Therefore, assortative mating by income seems to be an important 
factor in explaining intergenerational income persistence and reproduction of income inequality, 
which calls for further analyzes on income mobility on family levels all over the income 
distribution. 
  25
Tables and figures 
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Tables 
 
 
 
Mean St.dev. Min. P10 P50 P90 P95 P99 Max.
Father ‐ son
Age: Father 44.4 6.42 25 37 44 49 53 56 87
Son 38.3 2.26 35 35 38 40 42 42 42
Earnings: Father 353.6 216.47 0.6         188        310        402        542        682        17,219  
Son 443.8 320.53 0.1         252        379        496        680        858        38,416  
To. income: Father 357.1 264.01 0.1         173        309        404        551        702        25,408  
Son 463.8 443.99 0.0         218        393        520        723        920        79,200  
Father ‐ daughter
Age: Father 44.4 6.42 24 37 44 49 53 56 87
Daughter 38.3 2.26 35 35 38 40 42 42 42
Earnings: Father 353.2 219.52 1.0         188        310        402        541        684        17,219  
Daughter 312.3 140.29 0.5         189        293        358        444        530        7,520    
To. income: Father 357.3 276.62 0.1         172        309        404        552        704        25,397  
Daughter 329.0 188.80 0.0         187        305        381        478        571        34,262  
Mother ‐ son
Age: Mother 40.9 5.59 24 34 40 44 49 51 66
Son 38.3 2.26 35 35 38 40 42 42 42
Earnings: Mother 183.1 88.08 0.1         83           175        233        287        324        2,473    
Son 441.8 325.24 0.1         251        379        494        673        844        38,416  
To. income: Mother 182.9 92.86 0.0         84           173        228        284        324        9,796    
Son 463.6 445.67 0.0         216        394        521        723        920        79,200  
Mother ‐ daughter
Age: Mother 40.9 5.59 25 34 40 44 49 51 65
Daughter 38.3 2.25 35 35 38 40 42 42 42
Earnings: Mother 184.5 91.33 0.1         84           176        234        288        325        5,425    
Daughter 314.9 139.90 0.5         190        296        361        449        534        6,695    
To. income: Mother 183.9 99.73 0.0         84           174        228        285        325        10,308  
Daughter 330.1 181.85 0.0         187        307        383        479        572        34,262  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics ‐ age, earnings and total income. Father ‐ child and mother ‐ child. 
2008‐prices.
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Mean St.dev. Min. P10 P50 P90 P95 P99 Max.
Father ‐ married son
Earnings: Father 358.4 217.82 0.6      192     313     407     552        696        8,799       
Mrd. son 471.6 346.12 0.1      272     396     523     722        917        38,416     
To. income: Father 365.7 263.16 0.2      181     314     412     564        724        12,821     
Mrd. son 512.3 427.62 0.0      285     425     563     785        1,008    41,869     
Father ‐ married daughter
Earnings: Father 352.4 221.09 1.1      188     310     401     540        681        17,219     
Mrd. dau. 312.9 137.84 0.8      193     292     357     443        531        6,651       
To. income: Father 358.8 274.51 0.1      175     310     405     553        706        24,909     
Mrd. dau. 337.9 180.15 0.0      204     313     388     484        579        34,262     
Father ‐ son‐in‐law
Earnings: Father 358.7 229.50 1.6      197     314     406     546        691        17,219     
Son‐in‐law 475.0 336.93 0.1      275     401     529     724        912        25,332     
To. income: Father 368.9 288.75 1.0      190     318     414     562        721        24,909     
Son‐in‐law 518.2 412.21 0.2      290     432     572     792        1,011    25,297     
Father ‐ daughter‐in‐law
Earnings: Father 360.7 220.23 0.7      193     315     409     556        701        8,799       
Da.‐in‐law 305.3 134.18 2.0      187     285     349     435        520        6,695       
To. income: Father 368.5 269.01 1.0      182     315     414     569        734        10,955     
Da.‐in‐law 332.5 159.70 0.0      202     309     381     476        570        8,937       
Father and mother ‐ son and daughter‐in‐law
Earnings: Parents 463.5 239.62 0.7      238     434     548     696        829        8,799       
Son/spouse 742.7 398.85 4.0      446     675     839     1,082     1,294    38,418     
To. income: Parents 516.2 292.81 28.8    275     474     591     759        924        11,604     
Son/spouse 855.4 501.44 36.5    541     756     947     1,233     1,496    42,241     
Father and mother ‐ daughter and son‐in‐law
Earnings: Parents 464.3 240.71 0.9      245     437     547     690        815        17,219     
Da/spouse 745.9 370.11 3.6      450     680     843     1,086     1,301    25,548     
To. income: Parents 517.0 298.91 38.7    283     478     591     752        907        25,072     
Da/spouse 858.2 463.83 36.5    546     762     952     1,237     1,506    24,860     
Table 2. Descriptive statistics ‐ earnings and total income. Father ‐ married child/child‐in‐law, and 
father couple ‐ child couple. 2008‐prices.
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Table 3. Income elasticities. Fathers. Earnings and total income. Quantile regression.
q=0.25 q=0.50 q=0.75 q=0.90 q=0.95 q=0.99 q=0.995
Earnings:
Son 0.118*** 0.146*** 0.186*** 0.217*** 0.231*** 0.257*** 0.267***
Daughter 0.086*** 0.098*** 0.108*** 0.132*** 0.152*** 0.178*** 0.188***
Son, married 0.123*** 0.154*** 0.194*** 0.221*** 0.236*** 0.261*** 0.267***
Daughter, married 0.081*** 0.097*** 0.109*** 0.134*** 0.152*** 0.178*** 0.190***
Son‐in‐law 0.082*** 0.109*** 0.139*** 0.155*** 0.173*** 0.211*** 0.232**
Daughter‐in‐law 0.043*** 0.064*** 0.087*** 0.119*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.146***
Total income:
Son 0.207*** 0.218*** 0.260*** 0.292*** 0.309*** 0.333*** 0.348***
Daughter 0.155*** 0.162*** 0.171*** 0.195*** 0.213*** 0.225*** 0.233***
Son, married 0.178*** 0.215*** 0.262*** 0.293*** 0.313*** 0.343*** 0.364***
Daughter, married 0.137*** 0.153*** 0.168*** 0.195*** 0.214*** 0.221*** 0.228***
Son‐in‐law 0.118*** 0.150*** 0.179*** 0.188*** 0.199*** 0.224*** 0.239**
Daughter‐in‐law 0.086*** 0.114*** 0.135*** 0.163*** 0.178*** 0.181*** 0.205***
* 0.05<p<0.10. ** 0.01<p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table 4. Income elasticities. Mothers. Earnings and total income. Quantile regression.
q=0.25 q=0.50 q=0.75 q=0.90 q=0.95 q=0.99 q=0.995
Earnings:
Son 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.071*** 0.090***
Daughter 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.071*** 0.060*** 0.065***
Son, married 0.026*** 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.082*** 0.090*
Daughter, married 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.057*** 0.068**
Son‐in‐law 0.023*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.035** 0.033 0.045
Daughter‐in‐law 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.050** 0.045
Total income:
Son 0.031*** 0.045*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.080*** 0.095*** 0.097***
Daughter 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.082***
Son, married 0.036*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.102*** 0.096**
Daughter, married 0.057*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.075*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.081***
Son‐in‐law 0.027*** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.061 0.058
Daughter‐in‐law 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.053*** 0.047
* 0.05<p<0.10. ** 0.01<p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table 5. Second generation’s husband and wife earnings and income correlations (elasticities). Quantile regression.
q=0.25 q=0.50 q=0.75 q=0.90 q=0.95 q=0.99 q=0.995
Earnings. Left hand side variable is:
Husband 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.153*** 0.120*** 0.096*** 0.027 0.021
Wife 0.070*** 0.113*** 0.152*** 0.196*** 0.212*** 0.202*** 0.200***
Total income. Left hand side variable is:
Husband 0.280*** 0.258*** 0.214*** 0.135*** 0.104*** 0.035 0.004
Wife 0.164*** 0.199*** 0.224*** 0.249*** 0.245*** 0.188*** 0.165***
* 0.05<p<0.10. ** 0.01<p<0.05. *** p<0.01.
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Table 6. Income elasticities. Father/mother's income ‐ son/daughter‐in‐law's and daughter/son‐in‐law's income. Quantile regression.
q=0.25 q=0.50 q=0.75 q=0.90 q=0.95 q=0.99 q=0.995
Earnings:
Son and wife 0.163*** 0.169*** 0.193*** 0.218*** 0.222*** 0.253*** 0.294***
Daughter and husband 0.141*** 0.149*** 0.170*** 0.186*** 0.193*** 0.203*** 0.220***
Total income:
Son and wife 0.196*** 0.240*** 0.299*** 0.344*** 0.366*** 0.451*** 0.480***
Daughter and husband 0.176*** 0.212*** 0.259*** 0.293*** 0.303*** 0.363*** 0.398***
* 0.05<p<0.10. ** 0.01<p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table A1. Income elasticities. Fathers. Earnings and total income. Piecewise OLS regression.
All 0<p<0.25 0.25<p<0.50 0.50<p<0.75 0.75<p<0.90 0.90<p<0.95 0.95<p<0.99 0.99<p<0.999
Earnings:
Son 0.176*** 0.032*** 0.312*** 0.417*** 0.229*** 0.397*** 0.243*** 0.126
Daughter 0.110*** 0.032*** 0.263*** 0.241*** 0.208*** 0.261** 0.027 ‐0.061
Son, married 0.177*** 0.019*** 0.293*** 0.462*** 0.220*** 0.250** 0.268*** 0.107
Daughter, married 0.108*** 0.026*** 0.233*** 0.254*** 0.209*** 0.138 0.013 ‐0.067
Son‐in‐law 0.123*** 0.01 0.233*** 0.306*** 0.165** 0.165 0.139 0.118
Daughter‐in‐law 0.072*** 0.016** 0.161*** 0.144*** 0.053 ‐0.224* ‐0.007 ‐0.168
Total income:
Son 0.244*** 0.067*** 0.354*** 0.380*** 0.292*** 0.368*** 0.304*** 0.260***
Daughter 0.165*** 0.039*** 0.377*** 0.318*** 0.220*** 0.155* 0.110** 0.074
Son, married 0.242*** 0.045*** 0.391*** 0.412*** 0.310*** 0.288*** 0.283*** 0.079
Daughter, married 0.163*** 0.025*** 0.376*** 0.319*** 0.232*** 0.16 0.124** 0.150*
Son‐in‐law 0.157*** 0.009 0.282*** 0.385*** 0.283*** 0.290* 0.181* 0.097
Daughter‐in‐law 0.111*** 0.020** 0.230*** 0.228*** 0.140** 0.053 ‐0.008 ‐0.235*
* 0.05<p<0.10. ** 0.01<p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table A2. Income elasticities. Mothers. Earnings and total income. Piecewise OLS regression.
All 0<p<0.25 0.25<p<0.50 0.50<p<0.75 0.75<p<0.90 0.90<p<0.95 0.95<p<0.99 0.99<p<0.999
Earnings:
Son 0.037*** 0.006 ‐0.076** ‐0.068* 0.281*** 0.02 0.372*** 0.354**
Daughter 0.055*** 0.009* 0.017 0.011 0.193*** 0.647*** 0.195* 0.187
Son, married 0.038*** 0.001 ‐0.083** ‐0.039 0.342*** ‐0.029 0.383*** 0.305*
Daughter, married 0.058*** 0.008 0.059* 0.054 0.275*** 0.697*** 0.193 0.24
Son‐in‐law 0.031*** 0.004 ‐0.082 ‐0.034 0.262** 0.136 0.214 0.605**
Daughter‐in‐law 0.041*** 0.009 ‐0.001 ‐0.022 0.281*** 0.051 0.127 0.136
Total income:
Son 0.048*** ‐0.003 0.225*** ‐0.119*** 0.238*** 0.569*** 0.397*** 0.564***
Daughter 0.065*** 0.006 0.110*** ‐0.018 0.354*** 0.536*** 0.257*** 0.07
Son, married 0.053*** 0.002 0.179*** ‐0.114*** 0.353*** 0.249 0.416*** 0.535***
Daughter, married 0.067*** 0.006 0.098*** ‐0.023 0.372*** 0.486*** 0.290*** 0.13
Son‐in‐law 0.034*** 0.000 ‐0.012 ‐0.036 0.240** 0.426 0.380** 0.098
Daughter‐in‐law 0.053*** 0.015** ‐0.045 0.054 0.301*** ‐0.090 0.299*** 0.316**
* 0.05<p<0.10. ** 0.01<p<0.05. *** p<0.01
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Table A3. Income elasticities. Father and mother's income vs son (daughter) and daughter‐in‐law's (son‐in‐law's) income. OLS regression.
All 0<p<0.25 0.25<p<0.50 0.50<p<0.75 0.75<p<0.90 0.90<p<0.95 0.95<p<0.99 0.99<p<0.999
Earnings:
Son and wife 0.194*** 0.068*** 0.227*** 0.258*** 0.312*** 0.568*** 0.278*** 0.010
Daughter and husband 0.168*** 0.063*** 0.225*** 0.255*** 0.414*** 0.295* 0.119 0.170
Total income:
Son and wife 0.269*** 0.142*** 0.207*** 0.401*** 0.444*** 0.320*** 0.286*** 0.133
Daughter and husband 0.229*** 0.121*** 0.214*** 0.391*** 0.408*** 0.290** 0.116* 0.196*
* 0.05<p<0.10. ** 0.01<p<0.05. *** p<0.01
